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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN IDGHER 
EDUCATION 
Ralph S. Brown, Jr.* 
I. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MODES OF REPRESENTATION 
T HE public sector of higher education is expanding rapidly, while the private sector is not. As a result, both the number and 
proportion of faculty members employed by public colleges and uni-
versities are increasing.1 It is clear that the current debate about 
collective bargaining for public servants is of profound importance 
to higher education. Until recently, this problem had been of no 
practical concern. In the 1930's, when labor unions generally were 
flourishing under the New Deal, the American Federation of 
Teachers (AFT) drew enough sympathizers in colleges and universi-
ties to form locals on many campuses.2 Some of these may have been 
rallying points for reform; but few if any sought recognition as collec-
tive bargaining representatives, and none achieved such status. In 
the past decade, however, the successes of the AFT in metropolitan 
school systems permitted a reinvigoration of its college department. 
The concurrent proliferation of new post-secondary public institu-
tions, especially community colleges, offered a fertile field for growth. 
These two-year institutions were often tied to the public schools, 
staffed by veterans of public school bargaining, frequently autocratic 
in administration, and strained by rapid expansion. Thus, they 
allowed a significant scope of union organization. Many public four-
year colleges oriented to teacher training exhibited similar character-
istics. Finally, as this Symposium illustrates, recent legislation in 
major states has given new encouragement to collective bargaining 
for public employees. 
Given these generally favorable influences, it is surprising that 
collective bargaining through an exclusive agent has not become 
more widely established in higher education. Even the most fervent 
proponent of organization, the AFT, probably did not have more 
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1. AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, A FACT BOOK ON HIGHER EDUCATION 8125 
(1968). 
2. For a useful and authoritative summary of AFT positions in higher education, 
see Kugler, The Union Speaks for Itself, 49 EDUCATIONAL REcoRD 414 (1968). 
[ 1067] 
1068 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:1067 
than a dozen college contracts in effect at the end of 1968.3 Of the 
contracts in existence, most were in Michigan and New York, and at 
community colleges. The most important units in terms of size were 
located in the Chicago City College, which has eight two-year cam-
puses, and among part-time and temporary teachers in the City Uni-
versity of New York, which consists of seventeen separate graduate, 
four-year, and two-year campuses.4 Overall, by the generous estimate 
of its chief spokesman, the AFT had "well over 15,000 faculty mem-
bers on over 100 campuses."5 
The American Federation of Teachers has had to make its way 
in higher education against what its officers must consider the tradi-
tional obstacles to recruitment of bargaining units-apathy, timidity, 
and outright hostility. It has also faced other professional organiza-
tions whose policies are sometimes complementary and sometimes ad-
verse to collective bargaining. For example, when the AFT made a 
vigorous but unsuccessful attempt to organize the eighteen Cali-
fornia state college faculties in 1966 and 1967, there were four other 
organizations to which faculty members belonged and which took 
positions in the controversy: the Association of California State Col-
lege Professors, composed of faculty members only, which somewhat 
equivocally offered itself as a rival candidate for representative 
status; the California College and University Faculty Association, 
associated with the California Teachers Association; the California 
State Employees Association, in which membership is open to all 
state employees, and which, like the preceding organization, favored 
the development of internal bargaining arrangements through the 
Faculty Senate; and the American Association of University Profes-
sors (AAUP), which also was opposed to exclusive representation by 
an external organization. 6 
Another example of local opposition to collective bargaining on 
the trade union model occurred in the recent City University of New 
3. It had, however, won a major victory in December of 1968 through an election 
to determine the representation of 6,000 part-time and temporary faculty members in 
the City University of New York, and at the same time it had suffered a major defeat 
in a separate election for the 5,000 full-time faculty of C.U.N.Y., N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 
1968, at 56, col. I. 
4. There is one contract at a federal institution, the U.S. Merchant Marine 
Academy, and, also uniquely, one in which an American Association of University 
Professors chapter is the representative, at Belleville Junior College, in Illinois. 
5. Kugler, supra note 2, at 414. The New York Times reported that the AFT has 
approximately 10,000 members in 70 locals. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1968, at 86, col. 1. 
6. See Larsen, "Collective Bargaining'' Issues in the California State Colleges, 53 
A.A.U.P. BULL. 217 (1967). The results of a poll of AAUP members on this issue is 
reported in 53 A.A.U.P. BULL. 350 (1967). At this point, it must be reiterated that the 
author as President of the AAUP is both officially and privately a supporter of its 
policies. 
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York election. There an organization of faculty members, the Legis-
lative Conference, had been active since 1938, chiefly in advancing 
faculty interests before the several state agencies that have some voice 
in the City University's affairs.7 The Legislative Conference initiated 
the representation proceeding that led to the election, partly, it 
seems, to forestall the AFT, and partly because of an independent 
judgment that without formally conferred statutory status it could 
no longer function effectively in its dealings with officials who seem 
unable to comprehend the legitimacy of any less orthodox arrange-
ments. A split decision resulted; the Legislative Conference was the 
majority choice of the faculty members eligible for tenure, but the 
AFT was chosen by the temporary and part-time teachers who were 
not on the university's tenure ladder. The other choice offered in the 
elections, "neither representative," finished a poor third.8 
It is unnecessary to offer further examples of multiple organiza-
tions in other systems and states. There are doubtless other oddities 
similar to the long-established Legislative Conference. Moreover, the 
California pattern is not uncommon, with the AAUP, the AFT, a 
faculty association of the particular institution, the state affiliate of 
the National Education Association, and the state organization of 
civil service employees all welcoming the allegiance of faculty mem-
bers, who may-and often do-belong to two or more of them, de-
pending on the strength of their joining and dues-paying proclivities. 
In this welter of organizational commitments, the academic may 
be infrequently confronted with questions of bargaining representa-
tion. In the national arena, the only well-developed positions are 
those of the AFT and the AAUP. The AFT follows the general 
pattern of American unionism as embodied in the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA)9 and state counterparts governing private 
and (increasingly) public employment. That is, it asserts that des-
ignating an organization independent of the institution as the 
exclusive representative of all the professional employees of the insti-
tution is normal and inevitable. It accepts a management-employee 
relationship between governing boards and administrations on the 
one hand and faculties on the other. It expects to bargain for and 
achieve through collective contracts uniform conditions of employ-
ment, through which it aspires to increase salaries and decrease work-
loads. With respect to the special characteristics of academic life, it 
supports academic freedom, early tenure, and the authority of the 
7. See Brown, Representation of Economic Interests: Report of a Conference, 51 
A.A.U.P. BuLL. 374, 375 (1965). 
8. See note 3 supra. 
9. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-68 (1964). 
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faculty qua faculty in such matters as curriculum development and 
the determination of scholastic standards. Emphasizing the autonomy 
of its locals, it also makes a point of "the strong community support 
engendered by being part of the organized labor movement."10 
The AAUP, on the other hand, generally rejects exclusive rep-
resentation by unions or any other external agencies because it has 
a different view of the proper organization of a university and of the 
faculty's place in that organization. Central to the AAUP's position 
is its commitment to "the proposition that faculty members in higher 
education are officers of their colleges and universities. They are not 
merely employees. They have direct professional obligations to their 
students, their colleagues, and their disciplines .... "11 This principle 
is more than an article of faith; it is a reflection of the practice pre-
vailing in well-ordered institutions, and it is implicit in a current 
authoritative Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, 
jointly formulated in 1966 by the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors, the American Council on Education, and the Associa-
tion of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges.12 Stressing 
shared responsibility and joint action, the 1966 Statement declares 
that the faculty should participate in such decisions as the following: 
(1) major changes in the size or composition of the student body; 
(2) basic decisions regarding buildings and other facilities to be 
used in the educational work of the institution; 
(3) selection of a new president, and of academic deans and other 
chief academic officers.13 
These and other instances of shared authority are joined with the 
faculty's "primary responsibility for such fundamental areas as cur-
riculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty 
status, and those aspects of student life which relate to the educa-
tional process."14 
An expert's observations on the Statement further illuminate the 
kind of faculty role ,that it envisages. The General Secretary of 
the AAUP, after mentioning some examples of shared authority, 
observes: 
IO. Kugler, supra note 2, at 417. 
11. Special Joint Committee on Representation, Bargaining, and Sanctions, Faculty 
Participation in Strikes, 54 A:A.U.P. BULL. 155, 157 (1968). The AAUP, founded in 
1915, has approximately 90,000 members in 1,150 chapters. 
12. The Statement has been reprinted in several educational publications, e.g., 52 
A.A.U.P. BuLL. 375 (1966), and is available in pamphlet form from the AAUP's Wash-
ington Office. 
13. 52 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 375, 376-77 (1966). 
14. 52 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 375, 378 (1966) (emphasis added). 
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One ... provision ... calls for more extended comment, because 
its spirit infuses the entire statement. The president's "leadership 
role is supported by delegated authority from the board and faculty." 
In strictly legal terms, all institutional authority may be in the hands 
of the board; but it has been commonly assumed that the board 
delegates authority to the president, and the president in turn may 
delegate certain parts of it to the faculty. The statement rejects that 
view of academic life. The faculty's authority, it is clear, rests not 
upon presidential understanding or largesse, but upon the faculty's 
right, as the institution's foremost professional body, to exercise the 
preeminent authority in all matters directly related to the institu-
tion's professional work.15 
If such a conception of faculty power is realized, there is little need 
for the faculty to resort to a bargaining model that assumes the 
centralization of operating and policy decisions in management. To 
a very considerable extent, the 1966 Statement sees the faculty as a 
part of management.16 
Even when the enviable "management" status exists, its presence 
does not mean that bargaining for economic gains is unnecessary. 
Clearly, those who provide public funds for higher education are 
faced with competing claims for limited resources, and are not likely 
to shower benefits on faculties unless faculty groups act on the maxim 
that the squeaking wheel gets greased. The AAUP position is that 
faculties organized for self-government can and should communicate 
their concerns to governmental ears: 
The Association recommends that faculty members, in decisions 
relating to the protection of their economic interests, should par-
ticipate through structures of self-government within the institution, 
with the faculty participating either directly or through faculty-
elected councils or senates. As integral parts of the institution, such 
councils or senates can effectively represent the faculty without taking 
on the adversary and sometimes arbitrary attitudes of an outside 
representative. 
Faculties in publicly supported institutions, after achieving what 
they can by themselves, will increasingly need to join hands with 
their colleagues on other campuses in order to deal with governing 
and coordinating boards that have broad jurisdiction, with executive 
agencies, with the legislatures, and with the national govemment.17 
15. Davis, Unions and Higher Education: Another View, 49 THE EDUCATIONAL 
REcoRD 139 (1968), reprinted in 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. 317, 320 (1968). 
16. See AAUP, Michigan's Public Employment Act and the State's Colleges 81-82 
(1967) (statement of Prof. Clyde Summers). 
17. AAUP Statement of Policy on Representation of Economic Interests, April 27, 
1968, reprinted in 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. 152, 152•53 (1968). 
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The upshot of the line of argument here presented is not that ex-
clusive representation by an external agency for collective bargain-
ing is unworkable; it is rather that such representation is incom-
patible with the professional goals of faculty members in higher 
education. 
The obvious rejoinder is to deny that the ideals of professional 
interdependence and autonomy are attainable. Thus an AFT spokes-
man asserts, "we must recognize that professors are not officers of an 
institution on appointment, but professional employees."18 An over-
worked teacher of English composition in a community college, 
meeting six sections in day and evening classes, required in effect to 
punch a time clock for daily office hours, disenfranchised from any 
influence over policies set by lofty and remote state boards and presi-
dents, might reject even the adjective "professional." There are too 
many like him, but he represents only part of reality. And, we cur-
rently lack the materials to make a comprehensive survey of good 
and bad practices in faculty-administration relations, other opin-
ions are available. To take a notable example, McGeorge Bundy, 
President of the Ford Foundation and former Dean of the Harvard 
Faculty of Arts and Sciences, has analyzed the current status of 
"Faculty Power": 
The growth of faculty responsibility and power in academic 
matters is obvious to all who see the daily give-and-take of academic 
bargaining. In the last twenty-five years the balance of power has 
shifted dramatically. Before the Second World War there were only a 
few places where tradition, excellence, and administrative restraint 
had combined to give the faculty great strength. Now that strength 
has been conferred on the academic profession as a whole by the 
massive authority of the law of supply and demand. The economic 
force of this law had been matched by a new level of social and politi-
cal prestige for men of learning as a class.19 
Even though Mr. Bundy is speaking of universities (and, one would 
have to add, not of all universities) he is describing a substantial 
portion of the profession. Clearly, there are many institutions where 
the model of shared authority has been attained; there are many 
more where it is attainable; and, unfortunately, there are many 
where it is not foreseeable. It is the first thesis of this Article that 
the advantages of an internal framework of representation make it 
worthwhile to strive for its realization. 
18. Kugler, supra note 2, at 415. 
19. Bundy, Faculty Power, THE ATLANnc MONTHLY, Sept. 1968, at 41•42. 
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II. THE EFFECT OF LAWS GOVERNING PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE BARGAINING 
A. The Nature of the Bargaining Groups Recognized 
1073 
Whatever the ideal relationship between authority and bargain-
ing arrangements may be, we can postulate that faculty members, 
like anyone else, should have considerable freedom of choice in the 
agency and manner by which they will be represented. Here the law 
can have something to say, as it has for other employed professionals 
and most of the labor force. Invoking the law brings us to the second 
thesis of this Article-a more even-handed one, which simply de-
clares that a legal framework for bargaining should not throw its 
weight toward support of one form of representation rather than 
another. Some recent statutes that legitimize and encourage public 
employee bargaining are clearly not even-handed when they are 
applied to higher education. They assume the primacy of the trade-
union model and ignore the unique characteristics of the academic 
community. 
If, in the absence of statutory authorization, there is uncertainty 
about the propriety of collective bargaining in any form for public 
employees, then the statute takes on special importance. Provisions 
that are simply protective or permissive in the context of private 
sector relationships may in the public sphere be interpreted as estab-
lishing undeviating commands, and thus may inhibit consensual 
variations. This possibility becomes acute when formal proceedings 
are initiated. The phenomenon can be illustrated by the example 
of a hypothetical public institution with a university senate com-
posed predominantly of faculty members, but containing some ad-
ministrators. Its expenses for maintaining a secretariat and other 
functions are borne by the university. The practice is for a commit-
tee of the senate to consult with university officers about salaries and 
other financial considerations, and for both faculty and administra-
tive spokesmen to urge the institution's needs before the appropriate 
legislative committees. Such an arrangement would be entirely 
compatible with the outlook of the 1966 Statement on Government 
of Colleges and Universities.20 If a statute is enacted that permits 
employee organizations to petition a state board for certification as 
bargaining representatives, and an election is scheduled to be held, 
what happens to the existing arrangements? 
20. See note 12 supra. 
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A similar issue is pending before the Public Employment Rela-
tions Board in New York State under the Taylor Law,21 concerning 
the university-wide Senate of the State University of New York. 
While the hypothetical situation above does not purport to describe 
the past activities of the S.U.N.Y. Senate, that body's leadership does 
wish to have the Senate included among the choices that the faculty 
will have in the election. The statute speaks of "employee organiza-
tions" as eligible for certification, and the statutory definition states 
that "[t]he term 'employee organization' means an organization of 
any kind having as its primary purpose the improvement of terms 
and conditions of employment of public employees."22 "Of any kind" 
is comprehensive enough to include the Senate, but what is its "pri-
mary purpose"? Did the statute's draftsmen mean to draw a very 
narrow definition, or a broad one? The keystone of the Taylor Law 
is the declaration that "[p]ublic employees shall have the right to 
form, join and participate in, or to refrain from forming, joining, or 
participating in, any employee organization of their own choosing."23 
It is hard to imagine "joining" the Senate, let alone refraining from 
joining it. But since it is an elected body, faculty members "partici-
pate" in it about as much as union members do in their unions. 
There are also at least two subsidiary questions on which the 
statute provides no direct guidance. Can a senate represent the fac-
ulty in bargaining when it includes members from "management," 
that is, from the administration? If this is an obstacle, it can be sur-
mounted by reconstituting the senate so that it is purely a "faculty 
senate." But what about the senate's use of university facilities and 
its support from university funds? Are these debilitating blandish-
ments, or simply a public recognition of the useful functions per-
formed by the senate? The AAUP Statement on Representation of 
Economic Interests declares that a "faculty elected council or senate 
... can have the requisite autonomy and independence of the ad-
ministration to carry out its functions."24 Whether it does have suffi-
cient autonomy is a question of fact that the faculty should be able to 
decide for itself; the decision should not be made for the faculty by 
an administrative agency. In the author's view, public support for a 
21. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968). [The present version of 
this law, as amended by a bill passed on March 4, 1969 (effective April 1, 1969), ap• 
pears in GOVERNMENT EMl'LOYEE R.ELA.TIONS REPORT, No. 288, at F-1 (March 17, 1969).] 
22. Id. § 201(6). 
23. Id. § 202. 
24. 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. 153 (1968). 
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faculty senate, without distinction between its bargaining and other 
functions, is just as much a proper cost of the university's operation 
as is support for the administration or for the state labor relations 
board. But it must be admitted that a state legislator might not take 
this view of an appropriation that would be used in part to extract 
even greater appropriations for faculty salaries. 
Either by forethought or by happy accident, the New Jersey 
statute of 196825 avoids many of these difficulties by creating a less 
restrictive definition of the bargaining agent. It provides that public 
employees may select a "representative" for negotiations, and defines 
"representative" as including "any organization, agency or person 
authorized or designated by a public employer, public employee, 
group of public employees, or public employee association to act on 
its behalf and represent it or them."26 
B. The Subject Matter of Bargaining 
Another cluster of problems crops up when a statute, in the con-
ventional language, describes the appropriate subjects of bargaining 
as simply "terms and conditions of employment." Some statutes con-
tain limitations on the scope of bargainable issues, but neither the 
limitations nor the generalization meets the special problem of a 
university faculty. That problem, stripped to its essentials, is to 
prevent the pervasive and traditional areas of faculty academic au-
thority from being absorbed into the newly created collective bar-
gaining process. Once a bargaining agent has the weight of statutory 
certification behind it, a familiar process comes into play. First, the 
matter of salaries is linked to the matter of workload; workload is 
then related directly to class size, class size to range of offerings, and 
range of offerings to curricular policy. Dispute over class size may 
also lead to bargaining over admissions policies. This transmutation 
of academic policy into employment terms is not inevitable, but it 
is quite likely to occur.27 Thus, an expert task force of the American 
Association for Higher Education, in a calm appraisal of the pros 
and cons of industrial-style collective bargaining for higher educa-
tion, concluded that an academic agency such as a faculty senate 
25. New Jersey Employer-Employees Relations Act, N.J. STAT . .ANN. §§ 34:13A-l 
to ·11 (Supp. 1968), amending N.J. STAT • .ANN. §§ 34:13A-l to -13 (1959). 
26. Id. § 34:13A-3(e) (Supp. 1968). 
27. Robert A. Gorman, Statutory Responses to Collective Bargaining in Institutions 
of Higher Learning, March 4, 1968 (unpublished memorandum located in the offices 
of the AAUP). 
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would probably "atrophy" in the shadow of an external bargaining 
agent.28 If the faculty considers such an outcome undesirable, it is 
possible to argue that the bargaining agent, whether external or in-
ternal, is after all under the faculty's control-a majority can in due 
course repudiate it and choose a new one. But this may be easier 
prescribed than accomplished. 
C. The Problem of Exclusive Bargaining Agents 
Much of the unease that the statutory pattern arouses in some 
quarters is traceable to the grant of exclusivity that usually accompa-
nies certification of a bargaining agent. The notion that the agent 
preferred by the majority represents everyone is so entrenched in 
American labor relations law that it seems futile ~o challenge it. It 
typifies strength through solidarity, majority rule, and other sup-
posed virtues. The fact that advanced Western European countries 
permit workers to be represented by agents that are really of their 
own choosing, even if the result is that more than one union deals 
with the employer, apparently carries little weight.29 It must be 
conceded that some of the opposition to exclusivity of representation 
in higher education comes from faculty organizations like the AAUP; 
they certainly fear loss of their own access to university officials to 
discuss issues of professional interest. However, they also have a more 
disinterested concern that exclusivity will combine with a broad 
range of bargainable issues to exclude the faculty's internal agencies 
from any meaningful role in governance. 
A related concern has to do with the faculty member's freedom, 
under otherwise exclusive arrangements, to pursue an individual 
grievance without having to seek and accept representation by the 
bargaining agency. This is an exceedingly vexing issue in labor rela-
tions generally. The AAUP, which with diffidence encourages its 
chapters to offer themselves as bargaining representatives if the cir-
cumstances seem to demand an external agency, is not at all diffident 
in its opposition to exclusivity; it urges any of its components that 
may achieve representative status "[t]o create an orderly and clearly 
defined procedure within the faculty governmental structure for 
prompt consideration of problems and grievances of faculty mem-
bers, to which procedure any individual or group shall have full 
28. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY PARTICIPATION IN 
ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE 3 (1967). 
29. Brown, Representation of Economic Interests: Report of a Conference, 51 
A.A.U.P. BULL. 375-76 (1965). 
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access."30 The pressure to channel everything through the bargaining 
agent is mitigated, in public employment, by the notion that the 
citizen's right to petition his government directly cannot be closed 
off either by statute or by contract.31 In higher education, moreover, 
the independent professional status of the faculty member provides 
another ground for asserting his freedom to advance some of his 
interests independently of the collective undertaking. But this line 
of argument invites an ideological collision with demands for uni-
formity of treatment. The AFT, for example, favors uniform salary 
schedules and deprecates "academic entrepreneurs who hop to other 
institutions that are ready to pirate them away with the lure of 
individual betterment."32 
When new legislation or alterations in existing statutes are pro-
posed, attention should be given to some of the problems that have 
been surveyed above, particularly to the need for clarifying the eligi-
bility of faculty senates and other internal bodies to act as bargaining 
representatives. The impetus for such provisions, if there is to be 
any, will have to come from professional organizations, since pro-
fessors, numerous as they have become, are only a small part of the 
public service establishment. Other general rules that do not deal 
adequately with the special circumstances of academic life are diffi-
cult and impractical to correct in the legislative process; the legisla-
ture is understandably more responsive to the interests of organized 
labor. When discretion is conferred on an administrative agency,33 
of course, a fuller opportunity exists to develop the case for internal 
controls. 
III. THE APPROPRIATE UNIT PROBLEM 
One subject over which an administrative body of government 
ordinarily has power is the determination of the appropriate bargain-
ing unit. The dimensions of this problem in higher education are 
not unlike those in other occupations. First there is the need to define 
the common interests that justify creation of a separate unit. Uni-
versity professors will usually claim that "members of the faculty" 
form an appropriate unit, but who are members of the faculty? In 
l!O. AAUP Statement of Policy on Representation of Economic Interests, April 27, 
1968, reprinted in 54 A.A.U.P. BULI.. 152, 154 (1968) (emphasis added). 
lll. Gorman, supra note 27. 
32. Kugler, supra note 2, at 417 (emphasis, presumably pejorative, is in the 
original). 
l!ll. In New York, for example, the Public Employment Relations Board has the 
important power to decide issues of exclusivity. N.Y. Ctv. SERV. LAw § 207 (McKinney 
Supp. 1968). 
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the City University of New York case, as previously noted, the New 
York Public Employment Relations Board established two units by 
drawing a line between those positions in which the occupants were 
eligible for academic tenure and those in which they were not.34 Not 
surprisingly, there were marginal categories that were hard to clas-
sify. Some of those who lie beyond the margin may be most in need 
of protection, particularly teaching assistants who are said to be ex-
ploited because of their lowly status as graduate students, or auxiliary 
professionals such as librarians and computer specialists who do not 
have the protection of academic tenure, but who may in other re-
spects have faculty status in their institution. Should institutional 
practice be controlling, or should general standards be sought? The 
boundaries of the academic community are hardly self-defining. 
The other dimensions of the appropriate unit problem are essen-
tially geographical and functional. An excellent example of these 
difficulties is the pending case of the State University of New York, a 
capacious organism which includes every variety of four-year, grad-
uate, and professional school, and which has jurisdiction-albeit 
shared with local groups-over dozens of community colleges. Apart 
from the especially awkward position of the community colleges, the 
hard question is whether a single unit is appropriate. It would ap-
pear to be, on first impression, since there is a single board of trustees 
and a central administration which-perhaps of most importance-
makes a single bid for appropriations to the New York legislature. 
But this is not self-evident either, and the appropriate-unit problem 
has been the occasion for extended hearings. 
There will always be some matters that are beyond statutory or 
administrative adjustment, and in this area the respect that is paid 
to academic mores can be enhanced or diminished in the bargaining 
process itself. Recall that the AAUP, if acting as an external bargain-
ing agent, stresses the importance of maintaining a channel through 
which any faculty member or group can pursue individual griev-
ances.35 Beyond this, an administration and a bargaining representa-
tive who were of like minds on principles of shared power could 
contract, within the expansive limits of the phrase "terms and condi-
tions of employment," to withdraw all sorts of academic issues from 
unilateral control of either administration or bargaining representa-
tive, and to reserve them for prescribed internal procedures with 
34. See text accompanying notes 7 and 8 supra. 
35. See text accompanying note 30 supra. 
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full faculty participation.36 In this way, ideals of academic govern-
ment could become the third-party beneficiaries of collective bargain-
ing agreements that might otherwise threaten them. 
IV. STRIKES BY FACULTIES OF PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 
The problem of strikes in relation to collective bargaining in 
public higher education has been left to the end of this Article, 
not because the issue is climactic, but rather for the opposite reason. 
For one thing, the AFT and the AAUP, the two national voices 
which often diverge on collective bargaining matters, are in har-
mony on the proposition that legal prohibitions of faculty work 
stoppages in either public or private institutions are unwarranted. 
In the words of an AAUP Committee Report, 
[p]ublic servants directly concerned with public health and safety-
the classic examples are police and firemen-may have to endure re-
straints on their freedom to refuse their services. While we place a 
lofty value on higher education, we do not believe that its interrup-
tion by a strike affects the public health and safety. If declarations of 
national emergency or other overriding public policies generally 
limited freedom to withhold services, we should not ask for nor ex-
pect discrimination in favor of teachers. But, along with the many 
other public functionaries whose continuous services are not vital to 
the community, teachers in public institutions of higher education 
should not have their liberties automatically restricted simply be-
cause (to the extent that they are employees) a governmental agency 
is their employer.s1 
But with respect to the propriety of faculty strikes, dissonance per-
sists. The AFT spokesman apparently regards strikes as a painful 
but unavoidable cost of "free unions," which "imply the right to 
withhold services as a protest against grave unprofessional condi-
tions."38 The content of "grave unprofessional conditions" is pru-
dently left undefined, but from the record it would presumably 
embrace a broader range of economic complaints than would move 
the AAUP to such action. As recently as 1966-the year of the AFT 
strike at St. John's University against conditions that were grossly 
unprofessional by anyone's definition-the Executive Committee of 
the AAUP declared that the Association "has never looked upon the 
strike as an appropriate mechanism for resolving academic contro-
26. Gorman, supra note 27. 
27, Special Joint Committee, supra note II, at 158. 
38. Kugler, supra note 2, at 417. 
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versies or violations of academic principles and standards."39 That 
position has been undergoing re-examination; there is pending for 
adoption as AAUP policy a statement that recalls the special privi-
leges and responsibilities of faculty members and characterizes the 
strike as inappropriate "for the resolution of most conflicts within 
higher education."40 The proposed statement goes on to declare: 
Situations may arise affecting a college or university which so 
flagrantly violate academic freedom (of students as well as of faculty) 
or the principles of academic government, and which are so resistant 
to rational methods of discussions, persuasion, and conciliation, that 
faculty members may feel impelled to express their condemnation by 
withholding their services, either individually or in concert with 
others. It should be assumed that faculty members will exercise their 
right to strike only if they believe that another component of the 
institution (or a controlling agency of government, such as a legis-
lature or governor) is inflexibly bent on a course which undermines 
an essential element of the educational process.41 
The accompanying AAUP committee report, after speculating that a 
faculty might be so underpaid and overloaded as to undermine the 
educational process, "emphatically reject[s] the industrial pattern 
which holds the strike in routine reserve for use whenever economic 
negotiations reach an impasse."42 
There have been too few strikes in higher education, public or 
private, to permit useful analysis of their etiology or pathology. Nor 
can one predict with any confidence what will or should happen when 
a strike is unsuccessful and the striking faculty members are replaced 
or dismissed. With respect to the painful possibility of sanctions 
against striking faculty, the only thing that the AAUP's deliberation 
has produced is an admonition that due process must be afforded.48 
V. THE FUTURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
About a year ago, the American Council on Education made a 
survey of expectations of people in higher education about trends to 
1980. The respondents were also asked to express their approval or 
disapproval of what they foresaw. In reply to a question on the preva-
lence of collective bargaining by college and university faculties, 
39. Special Joint Committee, supra note 11, at 156. 
40. Special Joint Committee, supra note 11, at 157. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 158. 
43. Id. at 157-58. 
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forty per cent of the administrators said that they expected it to 
become commonplace, and ninety per cent stated that they did not 
like the prospect.44 The reasons for the responses were not solicited 
(it was a very long questionnaire), and they are not easy to divine. 
The dislike of collective bargaining may have some principled basis, 
or it may simply represent apprehensiveness about something new 
and therefore presumably arduous. If some respondents thought that 
collective bargaining would result in more formidable expectations 
to be satisfied, they should heed the views of Chancellor Mitchell of 
the University of Denver. Fresh from a career in publishing, Mr. 
Mitchell was astounded (and dismayed) by the pressure for organized 
faculty power. "If I were a faculty member," he said, "I would trade 
any union contract I ever signed for the present unwritten contract 
under which faculty are employed at a university and feel I had in-
herited enormous amounts of flexibility . . . . One comes quickly 
to the conclusion that it is hard to beat the present deal."45 As for 
the prediction that collective bargaining will burgeon, did the presi-
dents and vice-presidents mistake the wave of the past for the wave 
of the future? Do they think that, despite the stasis of unionism in 
commerce and industry, its dynamism will revive among public em-
ployees in higher education, particularly in the lower reaches of 
higher education? 
In the present disordered state of the world and the universities, 
one does not have to be unusually pessimistic to expect a general 
hardening of lines of communication and action. Instead of the spirit 
of cooperation and open communication that infuses the 1966 State-
ment on Government of Colleges and Universities, one can foresee 
each component of the university becoming distant, withdrawn, 
adversary. Perhaps ·wrongly, collective bargaining-with its connota-
tion of dealing at arm's length-may be viewed as the style best 
adapted to periods of truce in a Thirty Years' War. 
It seems equally likely, unless a new equilibrium with some 
resemblance to the old reappears, that the current instability may 
lead to new groupings and new contests for power to control deci-
sions in higher education. The emergence of a third force-that of 
organized and activist students-is disrupting the bipolar world in 
which faculty on the one hand, and administration plus governing 
board on the other, were dominant and other groups-alumni, 
44. AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, THE FUTURE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY: CON-
TINUITY AND CHANGE 140 (1968). 
45. Mitchell, The Curious World of University Tenure, CoMPAcr, Aug. 1968, at 
l!l, 33. 
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parents, students, officials-had satellite roles. This is not the place, 
nor am I qualified, to explore these large trends. One can only sug-
gest that faculty members may have to look to their allegiances. 
Will they prefer to move closer to the students? To the administra-
tion? To close ranks with their fellows? Will they have a choice? It 
may be that something not now known will displace both the co-
operative model and the bargaining model in the politics of higher 
education. This would be cause for some regret; both models have 
their merits and both are rooted in experience, yet neither has been 
fully developed nor widely embraced. 
